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The Lessons of History
JAMES BAKER (FORMER US SECRETARY OF STATE)
Well there were a number of factors not least of which it was our view that the operation would be more broadly supported by the American people if it was also supported by the Security Council and was thus an international action rather than just a US action.
If you think back to those days we were facing a Congress both houses of which were dominated by members of the opposite party. There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing about what the cost of an operation would be, what was the basis for legal legitimacy, what were the expected casualty estimates and things like that and we just felt that we were on much more solid ground if we were able to generate Security Council support.
Now I have to tell you that we would never have put a resolution on the table for a vote unless we knew in advance that we had the votes to achieve that resolution. We waited in fact until the United States was in the presidency, in the chair as president of the council so we were in a position where we could pretty well control the process in the Security Council itself and I don't think we would have called for a vote unless we had known in advance that we had the votes.
It was our view that we had the authority to do what we did notwithstanding Security Council approval and I think President Bush was committed to doing it in any event.
As it turned out it was the right decision to take. We had extraordinary broad support from around the world.
In fact, many countries who were directly involved in the Persian Gulf contributed substantially - as did other countries not involved - to the cost of the war. And the United States didn't have to bear that cost alone.
It was the end of the Cold War, the President was talking in terms of a new world order. To what extent was that a factor in your calculations and to what extent did you see this as a new model for the way international problems were going to be sorted out?
Well I don't know that we saw it as a new model for the sorting out of all international problems.
I think the time was unique. Communism had collapsed, the Cold War which most of us had known all our adult lives had ended, everybody in the world pretty much wanted to get close to the United States - we were the only remaining superpower - but the course was pretty well set in the first few days when we were able to get the Soviet Union to stand with us to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and to join with the United States in supporting an arms embargo against Iraq.
That was unprecedented.
That phrase 'all necessary means' that became so important in one of the UN resolutions, that was something initially that you weren't entirely happy with was it. You wanted something a bit tougher to make it clear that America would take military action if Saddam Hussein didn't do what he was instructed to do by the United Nations?
Well that's correct.
We first started talking about military action but remember we had to bring the Soviet Union along.
We also had a debate with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze about whether or not we would have two resolutions instead of one: one resolution condemning it saying it should be reversed and a second resolution much in the way that the events unfolded in this latest war, then specifically authorising military action.
But when we first started out we were talking about military action - the Soviets didn't want any mention of military action and we finally settled on the phrase ' all necessary means' but there was no doubt in the minds of anybody on the Council about what that meant.
How significant was that vote to authorise military action, because it is pretty rare in the Security Council's history isn't it?
I am not sure that it has ever happened except in the Korean War where the Soviets walked out and didn't participate in the debate.
That's why I said I think this may be the only time that the Council has authorised the use of force, military force, in keeping with its Chapter Seven responsibilities, the only time that that has happened and I think that the founders of the United Nations envisaged it happening more often than this.
The period that we've been talking about was I suppose, it's arguable, perhaps the high point of the United Nations - the moment at which its powers seemed most effective. How would you describe its status today after the divisions over Iraq?
Well I think that the United Nations was hurt by the divisions over Iraq, I think that NATO was hurt by the divisions over Iraq, I think the European Union was hurt.
All of these organisations in my view were diminished to some extent but not irreparably.
The United Nations does an extraordinary amount of very good work in any number of areas. It's not there just for its security responsibilities under Chapter 7. And it's a very important institution.
Just finally looking back on the last few months. Would you have done it that way? I mean it's so different from the way you did it for the first Gulf War.
We you are not, you can't really answer that, you are not privy to the intelligence, you are not there dealing with the issue on a daily basis.
I was one of those who encouraged the President to go to the UN in the first instance in last fall or Summer or early fall where there was a debate internally in the administration about whether to just go in unilaterally and do it.
I mean I don't think you can argue that the United States just went off here unilaterally and did this.
There was a substantial coalition, you had some very major countries involved, including Italy and Spain, and the United Kingdom and others and America - the United States administration did everything in the world it could to get the UN to sign on.
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