 |
| |
Clare Short
Q: Could we start by going back to last summer, to the autumn? In strategic terms, how important do you think it was to convince the Americans to go through the UN process in terms of dealing with the crisis in Iraq?
SHORT: I think it was important to respect the UN and its authority and I actually think the world needs the UN more than ever before because there is so much disorder in the world and if we haven't got some central place of making decisions and some respect for international law, we are all in trouble. It's not just that we should respect the UN because we all love the UN, it is we need it. I think America needs it too but doesn't understand that, but America can't make itself safe through American power. In fact it could make it more subject to antagonism across the world.
So I think it would have been massively preferable to keep the world together through the UN, to exhaust all options for getting disarmament and indeed I would have liked to seen Saddam Hussein indicted and removed without all-out war because the poor old people of Iraq weren't responsible for him and they'd suffered so much. George Bush of course was persuaded by lots of different people, I think including his father probably most strongly of all, to go to the UN over Iraq and sort of challenge the UN to deal with Iraq. But then I think the subsequent events showed that the US had a deadline and they were only going to go through the UN if the UN gave them what they wanted.
Q: So you're convinced of that, are you? That it was literally just diplomatic cover they were looking for really, that they'd decided what to do and indeed the prime minister knew that and was on side with that?
SHORT: I am afraid that is my conclusion, that they had the date, the spring date, if you remember as their target date for military action. I think originally it was February the 15th and then a month more because of the complications with Turkey and the complications with Tony Blair's position in the UK that led them to have another month. I think nothing else explains the failure to allow Blix to complete his work. I mean what was the big rush? You know it had been twelve years, we had got unanimity on 1441, we had got weapons inspectors back in, we had got a lot of ballistic missiles - sixty-four of seventy destroyed. The pressure was really on the regime to co-operate, we were making progress and then suddenly it was Blix hasn't got everything and then started briefing against Blix and then had to bring it to war. I think there was a target date, I think there's no other explanation.
But I think probably for for US public opinion President Bush needed to be able to talk of a coalition and of a UN process. Now obviously the coalition was rather thin. US, UK and a few Australian planes and then there was sort of forty-odd poor little countries who put their names on the list but didn't sort of do anything and kept using this word coalition. So I think having gone to the UN and being able to give the sort of impression of a coalition and some kind of authorised action they felt able to stick to their date. They sort of used the UN rather than respected the process.
Q: And what lessons do you think there are to be learnt from what was really a pretty spectacular failure wasn't it because not only did it fail to prevent war which I suppose was one of the ideas behind the United Nations but the world wound up more divided than it was at the beginning of the process. What do you think are the implications of that failure?
SHORT: I think the potential implications are very serious. I mean I think the US is like a wounded giant at the moment, very angry about September 11th - very understandably and I think the whole world sympathised with that - determined to sort of take action and show its power, almost looking for things to take action against but stoking up more and more hostility and hatred of the US. No doubt of that of course but it's go so much military power, people go for terrorism as the way of expressing that hatred and actually the thing we're trying to deal with is being made worse by the methods that they're using. The bitter divisions in the international community also exacerbate that tension and anger and sense that there isn't justice in the world which is bad for everybody, bad for getting a sense of progress and justice and dealing with Al Qaeda and so on.
I think for the UN, the people who refused to respect the Blix process and keep the UN united then turned round - the US and the UK to an extent - and said the UN is useless but they were the ones that were responsible for the UN, the Security Council not being able to agree. I think then the UN felt very bruised, very marginalised, very worried about being marginalised and there was a lot of rhetoric out of the US saying ... about the UN. I mean they did eventually come back for oil for food resolution and then you know eventually sanctions lifting and all that which of course they had to come back to the UN for but the net long-term effect, I wonder!
Given that Iraq is still a big problem, given that there is such a mess in the country I suspect the long term effect might be chastening and there might be lesson learning saying actually that wasn't a very clever way of doing things and a bit more thinking in the US that they do need international law and they need the UN. I think there will be more and more people - and I've seen this, I think maybe Desai gave a speech or a paper saying the case for reform in the Security Council is now overwhelming and you need a more representative Security Council and maybe qualified majority voting. I think some of those discussions will move forward. So it's been a terrible setback but I suspect it won't be terminal because it has led to a lot of mess for the world that is damaging to everyone including US interests.
Q: I was going to ask you about some of those structural issues because the power structure as it were in the United Nations was designed in a very different age wasn't it - the aftermath of the Second World War - we now have a position where you have actually only got one world superpower. Do you think it's possible to construct a system which would keep that superpower within the system but at the same time preserve the idea of multi-lateral action?
SHORT: I think there is a broader point, yes it was constructed to deal with the Cold War - just before - and then that became the big issue to stop the Cold War going hot. And I think in a way having lots and lots of meetings and lots and lots of bureaucracy and rather slow processes, which it does have, is really a rather good way of dealing with the Cold War and keeping all these men talking talking talking and not letting the Cold War go hot. I think it means reform. I mean in this day and age it needs to be sharper and more efficient, able to resolve conflicts that are breaking out all over the place because the permafrost of the Cold War division in the world has gone away, so yes it needs to change, and then of course the veto holding powers were the big powers at the end of the Second World War and that needs adjusting. But whether there will ever be agreement on the adjustment is a big question. I mean Britain's position is that India should be, have a government seat but it needs to be a bigger thing than that rather than just short of saying I like you, why don't you come and join? So I think it's a real challenge, can we update it?
And I think it will only happen if America, having gone through this kind of unilateralist phase, decides that it is not good for it and that it needs more of a sense that America supports justice in the world, is law-abiding, that America starts to realise that that's in America's interest and then it might return to wanting to help the UN update itself and become more efficient. That would be my optimistic scenario.
Q: But that's a precondition of it working do you think in the future because the fault that was revealed during the Iraq crisis was that if America wants to do something it will do it anyway whether or not the United Nations can be brought along?
SHORT: Absolutely but of course that isn't a UN problem. The greatest power in the world and the greatest military power in the world has the ability to take military action wherever it likes. That's clear and sort of not surprising. I mean despite the voice of all the hawks - the neo-conservatives in this US administration, very dismissive of the UN and vice president Cheney said early on we don't want to go to the UN, didn't want to be constrained, didn't want American power constrained - they felt the need to go. And I don't think President Bush went out of respect for the UN, he went out of the risk to the US with its own public opinion of going unilaterally, being more controversial, getting less support.
So we're talking now about a massive economic power and a massive military power - I think it was 40% of all the military capacity there is in the world is US and they're planning to expand their military spending - the UN will keep going. I mean it's still very important for lots of conflicts in Africa, lots of other things, keep on you know not - 60% of the Security Council's time is spent on Africa and there are a lot of conflicts there and we're making some progress there and Sierra Leone was a success and we're moving on Congo even though, even though it's difficult but a big reform and a big updating of the UN in the modern world requires America wanting to do it.
Q: If we just finish the history as it were, can you take us through your own thinking which led you to making that very grave challenge that the prime minister had been reckless, and then after that deciding that you weren't - despite what you'd said - going to resign from the government?
SHORT: Well I'd decided by the week before we ended up going to war that it was inevitable, and that I was going to leave the government, and I've been around for long enough to know that it's not wise to denounce military action when it's starting and you've got troops on the ground and they're vulnerable so I decided to make my last pitch plea through the media to the prime minister assuming that it wouldn't work and say how dangerous I thought it was for the UN's authority, for the Middle East, the bitterness that would grow from his own position and so on, and fully intending that this was a precursor to me leaving the government.
And then the prime minister - many others, but the prime minister pressed me and pressed me very very hard to remain. I believed the claim that President Chirac had said he would veto any second resolution, that I now know to be false, a member of the public sent me a clear record of what President Chirac said on the 10th March and he said the Blix process must be allowed to be completed but if the inspectors come to the Security Council and say we can't achieve the disarmament, then the Security Council will have to support military action. I mean so it wasn't true that a second resolution wasn't possible but I believed it when I was told that, but that was France's position and the prime minister gave me very strong assurances that the UN would have the proper role in post-conflict Iraq.
And this is crucial in international law. Occupying powers in occupied territory don't have the authority to engage in major reform or create a new sovereign government, and it's always been everyone's understanding that that's a UN role as in, as in Afghanistan. I'm afraid that wasn't honoured and we got a compromise Security Council resolution which is probably better than nothing but has downgraded the UN. It's only sort of equal with the coalition in trying to bring a new Iraqi sovereign government into being but that's the story. I didn't like the way we got to war but thought I couldn't do anything to stop it and I was given these, this firm information that proved to be wrong that France had made a second resolution impossible. By then we'd got the Attorney-General's advice which there was doubts about whether he was going to say it was legal but it was unequivocal that legal authority flowed from previous UN resolutions. I couldn't stop the war and the prime minister was asking me and obviously the NGOs in my department and obviously in the international system to stay and the prime minister gave me the assurance that the UN would have its proper role in the reconstruction so that was something of a sacrifice and I got lots of flak from it.
But then that wasn't adhered to and the UN didn't have a proper role and I found out what Chirac had really said and it became impossible for me to defend the position of the government.
Q: Can you talk a bit more about the principle at stake in the UN, what you would regard as a proper role in the reconstruction? Why is that so important?
SHORT: Well if you think of the other occupying power in occupied territory, that the whole world is aware of, it's Israel in the West Bank and Gaza and ... war, became the occupying power and it's not supposed to build the settlements because they're not supposed to take land you know but there's all these arguments about breaking the Geneva Convention but of course Israel in the West Bank and Gaza wouldn't dream of saying that's not the Palestinian government, we'll just put in another Palestinian government or we'll take control of the finances of this place. Now that's what the coalition has done in Iraq. It's very unusual. Kofi Annan in the press conference when he announced the appointment of Sergio de Mello as his special representative for Iraq said it's very unusual for the UN to act just as a partner and equal with an occupying power, but here we are and it's very important for the people of Iraq that we help them rebuild their country so that's a departure from the norm.
I mean - and significantly, I mean America was a big mover on Afghanistan and Afghanistan was a thing that was about Al Qaeda being headquartered there and the UN was called in to organise the ... team and bring together some Afghans and then a wider ... process and then a consultation on the constitution leading up to elections and there was no questioning at that stage that that's the proper UN role and only the UN could do it so the resolution we got for the reconstruction of Iraq was a long way from everybody's understanding of what's proper but of course once you've got the Security Council resolution, then that's sovereign and it's laid down what can be done.
I think personally, I think that's unfortunate and I think politically it's unwise because in all the mess and the looting and the continuing suffering in Iraq I think the UK and the US would be better served by the UN starting the process of assembling an Iraqi government. The danger is that there's more and more antagonism to the coalition and the only government they have to bring into being isn't respected by the people of Iraq and we could get quite a mess in Iraq and the coalition could get bogged down in Iraq and that would be bad for the people of Iraq and bad for the coalition, so I think it's unwise but that's what's happened and we've got to make the best of it and still try and help Iraq rebuild itself.
Q; Striking that you say that 40% of the Security Council's time is spent on Africa which --
SHORT: Sixty.
Q; Sixty percent which I suspect will come as a surprise to most people who perhaps think more of the failures of the UN in Africa, Congo being a very good example. What are we to make of the fact that it seems very difficult to get anybody to send any troops to Congo but lots of troops go to Iraq?
SHORT: I mean let's be clear. There were failures in Africa, Somalia was spectacular President ... when he was president and the American lead and desperate for Ruanda, the failure to intervene which meant again ... signed up to the genocide convention obliging us all to intervene. That was a desperate and dreadful failure but since then we've had success in Sierra Leone. That was a UN peace-keeping operation and the UK took a role but it was a UN operation ... the validity of the country and the end of the conflict and so on, and in Congo which is a massive country as big as Western Europe, fifty-odd million people, this government ... and this phase of conflict is a consequence of the people responsible for the genocide in Ruanda having gone out to Congo and trying to re-invade Ruanda. There is a UN process, they've got a transitional government bringing all the parties to the conflict into an interim government with the process of constitution building and so on. And there's a UN monitoring the peace process force but there's the trouble in the East and it needs a bit more muscle, and France appears to have stepped forward and said it will provide that and that's very good because most peace-keeping forces, the Security Council authorises them, the big powers in the world pay for them, roughly in proportion to their percentage of world wealth so the US is a big payer. I think the UK is about 20%, something like that, but usually then the call for troops goes out, in poor countries some troops partly because they get paid for and you know it's a way of getting in some money to help pay for your armed forces and they are often the kind of command structure ... everyone isn't properly pulled together, they're not well led troops often. That's the pattern so the Security Council will authorise. I mean poor countries send troops and the big powerful countries with strong logistics stay out of it when it's Africa. They go for it when it's the Balkans and so on. That's the story so France moving on Congo's needs is significant and the talk from the EU which has been talking about you know this rapid deployment force for Europe, Solana is talking about the EU mobilising for the Congo. It wouldn't have to be massive peace-keeping forces, just strong logistics, strong leadership, bringing in some equipment because these wars in Africa are often boys who are drugged up with Kalashnikovs. They're doing all this harm but they're not big powerful armed forces and if you just got a bit of strong equipment, and some armed helicopters and things into the field you could probably bring it to an end very quickly.
Q; But are you not back to the same tension between national interests and a wish for benign multi-lateral action? You're not going to find the Americans for example going into the Congo in the way they did in Iraq.
A: Actually the Americans are taking an interest in the peace process in, in Sudan ... long-running war causing a lot of suffering and they are taking an interest in Congo, a growing interest. I mean there is a lot of oil in West Africa, Nigeria and Angola, so there's those sets of reasons but the other thing surely - if Afghanistan was a danger to the world as a failed state in which a wicked organisation like Al Qaeda could hide and train people, how about a failed continent? If Africa can't move forward, and it's got a lot of problems as it is - 20% of its people are living under conditions of conflict, HIV Aids is raging across the continent and some ... of the third of the adult population is infected and that has massive economic consequences as well as human suffering - we could have a failed continent full of criminality. It's got rich minerals, all sorts of ... political and criminal forces could hide there. It's twenty miles from Europe, it's a danger to the world so doing the right thing by Africa is actually in the intelligent self-interest of the US and of Europe.
Q; And in addressing those sorts of problems and Aids, hunger, poverty and so forth, how important is the UN as an institution? What can it do that individual countries can't do?
SHORT: The UN is fantastically important for its moral authority and its norm-setting ability. When it comes to hunger and famine and crises, it is the only organisation that can move anywhere in the world when there is a crisis and can quite rapidly deploy the right kind of people to move very quickly to bring in food, to bring engineers if you need water, refugees or whatever the kind of crisis is. We have been working, the Department for International Development, on helping the UN improve its kind of core co-ordination so they immediately send someone into a country, assess what's needed and then make the call on all the UN organisations and all the bilaterals about what to send - in other words you used to get no food and too many tents and that kind of problem - so there has been an improvement in efficiency in recent years.
The World Food Programme that deals with food crises is a very efficient organisation - massive logistics, they have to get food from all over the world, ships, aeroplanes. They do it fantastically efficiently, I mean avoiding this what could have been a horrendous crisis in Southern Africa has been a phenomenal achievement. Right through Afghanistan they were keeping it was five million people daily fed and then it went up to nine million people right through the crisis. I mean these are fantastic operations so I mean the system is under strain because there are so many crises in the world and so much need for food and support but it is actually a very efficient system and there is nothing anywhere else. I mean individual bilateral development agencies like our own which is a fantastically efficient and high quality ... we can't move to every single emergency in the world whereas they can and they have got pre-positioned equipment all over the world in different regions.
We can't live without the UN, I mean it isn't an optional extra. We'd just have chaos and dreadful crises in the world if we didn't have it. If you come to HIV, we have got UN Aids. Now it is not meant to be operating everywhere on the ground dealing with the problems of HIV/AIDS in every country in the world. It is meant to be the sort of intellectual and moral holder of the world's determination to do right but also it is the centre of expertise on how to do right and there are lessons, like Uganda has done enormously well - come down from 30-odd per cent infection rates down to 5% amongst young people so there are lessons of success. They need applying more generally and UN AIDS is an efficient organisation that has that kind of wisdom and knowledge and it's working on improving its effectiveness. I am not saying it is all perfect but it's not all hopeless either.
UNICEF is a very efficient organisation. In Afghanistan after the end of the war just getting children back to school which was a big priority because women hadn't been allowed to teach and girls hadn't been allowed to go to school, it was UNICEF that moved very rapidly, opening up schools, you know, getting the whole thing - 3 million children were got back to school, half of them girls, very quickly. So there is a lot of efficiency in the system and all that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has its authority because it was agreed at the UN. It was the UN Security Council that set up a committee to deal with terrorism after September 11th and required every country in the world to make preparations to deal with money laundering and the rest. That was a UN process.
The Ottowa Convention, landmines, I mean we can't live without the UN - we have no other way of setting out rules and norms, of spreading best practise - we can make it work better but it does some things very well and if we haven't got it, the world will fall into chaos and crises of a very serious nature.
Q: Do you think Africa suffers from these sort of structural difficulties with the Security Council we were talking about a moment or two ago? It's the one continent I suppose isn't it that doesn't have a permanent member technically?
SHORT: It doesn't have a permanent member indeed and of course we saw in the run up to Iraq the attempts to bully the African regional collective members and of course when you're a very poor country and very powerful countries are putting pressure on you with aid and the rest, that's the danger and there was an attempt though they actually didn't succeed which is impressive and interesting. I think a properly reorganised Security Council would have - I don't know - rotating regional representatives or something and would have qualified majority voting but the world's mindset has got to change till we get there really. In the meantime we've got to manage with what we've got. We've got to improve the UN's operations in Africa and that's a desperate ... scenario in Ruanda. I think we're beginning to do it myself. There's more to do and we need this willingness from NATO-type countries to put in the logistics and leadership and some of the equipment that's needed and then there's work going on to help with training and organisation of African forces who would be their own peace-keepers but they need some back-up on equipment and so on. So I think, I think work's going on and we can improve it.
Q: Finally, do you think that the UN's capacity to deal with some of those fundamental problems like poverty and Aids has been damaged by the difficulties in the Iraq crisis?
SHORT: I think we've been working, all of us in development hard to improve the effectiveness of the whole international development system and that includes the UN parts of the system - all the UN development agencies - and we got this international agreement that we should all work together to achieve these millennium development goals - halving the proportion of people in poverty, getting all children into basic education, reducing infant and maternal mortality and so on. Now the IMF, the World Bank and everyone has come under those objectives, sort of measurable objectives that would just sort of increase the efficiency of the system. And there has been a lot of work with agency by agency, just improving the management, the effectiveness of their staff, the training, you know just the things that make an efficient organisation. I think that goes on.
I think the setback has been to the enthusiasm that we could have an era of a greater commitment to justice, that the whole world was uniting around that kind of objective, that one of the biggest threats to the future safety and security of the world was these levels of poverty, and I think Iraq has depressed the world and made people feel `how can I say with vigour that we have got this era of commitment for justice'. We mustn't give up, we must get back to it so I think it is not sort of organisational weakening. It's sort of motivation in the international system and belief that it is do-able and credibility.
| | | |
| |
| | |
Listen