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His Excellency Jean Marc de la Sabliere, interviewed by Edward Stourton.
I wonder if we could go back just to establish the context of what's happened over the last three months to the passage of resolution 1441. I know that you were still in Paris at that stage but what did you think that resolution meant?
Well I'm not sure it is very, very useful to, to comment the past but we are now looking forward and the council is united again and this is important but I can make some brief comment on, on the resolution 1441 which I think can help to understand our position and what happened.
Resolution 1441 is a resolution about disarming Iraq of its weapon of mass destruction. This is a first point, I think it is important point because it means that it is not a resolution about regime change. Regime change was not on the UN agenda despite the strong reservation we all had in the council about the very cruel dictatorship of Saddam Hussein but it was a resolution about disarming Iraq.
Second point, it was a resolution about disarming Iraq through peaceful means as a priority and I think it is important to recall that. The use of force was not excluded in the resolution but it was, it was introduced as a last resort. The use of force was envisaged only if the mechanisms set up by the Security Council that is to say a very inclusive inspection regime which was necessary because of the Iraqi behaviour could not allow the international community to reach its primary goal which is Iraqi disarmament through peaceful means.
And I would make a third point on this resolution because it was very clear that only the council on the basis of the report from the inspectors could decide to go to war. So these three point, was, were very clear in the minds I think of the majority of, of the members in the council and what happened in February and March is quite simple, the international community refused to authorise the use of force because the majority of the council and I could say the majority of the delegations of UN was of the opinion that inspections were making progress and everyone was, not everyone but the majority of in the council was convinced that our common goal which is, was disarming Iraq was reachable through peaceful means.
And within a limited period of time, this is what happened.
Absolutely understand you anxiety to talk about the future but I hope you will forgive me if I ask a couple of more things about the past because I am sure that you appreciate that you need to, we need to understand some of the lessons of that period if we are to know how we go from here. In terms of strategy did you see that resolution as something that offered the possibility that America would submit itself to the discipline of multilateral decision making, was that, was that in your minds?
Well we thought that there was a real possibility of, with this resolution reach this goal of disarming Iraq through peaceful means and, and with a in the UN context, yes certainly but we realised in when was it? In January, mid January that for the Americans the decision to, to, to, go, to war was taken.
You then or President Chirac then declared that he would veto any resolution that led to military action. Can you describe to me the calculations tat you made in advance of that statement for the President?
No I think this, the President was misquoted he, I think that people has to, to look very carefully on what he said in the interview you are referring to. The President very clearly said that he didn't rule out the use of force but the use of force would be a last resort and he said in this interview that if, if the inspectors come to the council and said we cannot do any progress we are stuck, we cannot do the job which you ask us to do then, then there will be no other option but the use of force, but the context was totally different.
The context was, the context were the inspections were making real progress and so this is why the use of force was, was considered as a not legitimate by, by the Council.
What the President said and he was not the only one to as a permanent member to say that, the Russian was of the same opinion and the German were not permanent members were also of the same opinion that whatever the, the, the result of the vote would be in the council we, we would vote no, we would vote no if there were only four or five vote, we would vote no if there was nine votes. So it is really he has been mis, misquoted I think.
But by that stage you had as you said a moment ago recognised that the United States was set on a course for war, you realised that back in January. What therefore was the thinking behind the President's statement, what did you think it was going to achieve?
No we were, it was a question of, of principle. The majority of the members of the council was considering that is was not legitimate in the circumstances we, we had described the progress of the inspection that it was not legitimate to, to vote to authorise the use of force so it was a question of principle, it was because it was a question of principle the President said, we will not vote this resolution in these circumstances, whatever the number of the vote would be. Because it was a question of principle. It was a question of principle for the majority in the Council.
It was at the end of that week I think that Sir Jeremy Greenstock the British ambassador finally said that Britain was giving up on the idea of a second resolution. What did you feel then? Because it was a very dramatic moment, did you feel that diplomacy had failed in some way then?
No I never thought that this resolution, this draft resolution could be adopted in the council, I never though, I never and this is something I have been saying for the since the beginning of the negotiations, I never thought that this draft resolution could be accepted by the majority in the council. I was totally convinced that the majority of the council was not in favour of authorising the use of force and I was convinced that despite the huge pressure made by the United States and the UK they would not be able to, to reach more than the, I don't know maybe four of five votes and this is what happened.
And it happened because head of states of all part of the world considered that well given the circumstances and the progress on the inspections the use of force was not legitimate.
Since then we have had the negotiations for resolution 1483 the resolution on the reconstruction of Iraq, can you tell me a little bit about that? Was the atmosphere very different to that that was there immediately before the war?
Well just after the .. the war after this I would say after this very difficult moment the council has to pass through the mood in the council was to try to help the Council unite again and this was something which was very clear in all the consultations former consultation we had but to help the council united we needed to have a, a draft resolution which could be accepted by the council and we had two faces in this discussion which was a long and complex discussion.
First we had many consultations very informal, informal consultations about what should be the issues dealt in such a post war resolution and without any text we discussed very long on these issues so everyone was able to, everyone knew exactly what was the position of all delegation and then the American and the British came with a text and the negotiation started and it last only a couple of weeks. And we had four objectives. The first one was, we as France and I would say the majority in the council. We first wanted, our first objective was the well being of the Iraqi people and I think that this was a shared objective by everyone in the council coalitions and other members. We all were, we were all looking for the well being of the Iraqi people. Second concern was the stability of Iraq and of the region. The third one was the credibility of the UN and I would say that there was a last another objective which was the link between the lifting of sanctions and disarmament. If I can comment each of these objectives you will understand how complex the negotiation was because some part of it was very technical.
The first, the first objective was the well being of the Iraqi people and the discussion was about how to end the Oil for Food Programme. As you know 60% of the Iraqi people was depending on the Oil for Food Programme, so it was not possible to end it without a phasing out and without an order phasing out a progressive completion of this programme. The draft proposed, the first daft proposed by our American and British friends was not clear enough and we had some concerns because despite all the discussion we had during this consultation, the phasing out was not enough well organised and the Americans and the British accepted to, to prolong this phasing out to from four months to six months and I would say that I was much more comfortable when they have accepted that.
Second, about the well being of the Iraqi people, we, there is something that was in them in the Council very important about the phasing out and the oil. The member of the Council were considered and I think they were right in considering that the oil which would be used to reconstruct Iraq is an Iraqi oil it is an Iraqi resource so it was very important to have as much as possible a transparent system about the sale, the oil sales and about the international fund set up to reconstruct Iraq, and which is funded with Iraqi oil.
And we have a very complex and technical discussion on this matter and we finally reach, reach a compromise which we consider acceptable.
The second concern was about the stability of Iraq and of the region. We were of the opinion that it was absolutely necessary for the international community to continue in helping the Iraqi people to set up as soon as possible a representative government internationally recognised and this is something essential because without an international representative government it would be very difficult to guarantee the unity of Iraq and the unity of Iraq is something which is in everyone's mind, so having this representative government was something very important for us ands we wanted to have in the resolution something very clear about the political process which will lead to this representative government.
The third, the third question and the first the third issue was about the credibility of the UN. What the coalition was asking is they were asking responsibilities and rights going beyond the Geneva conventions and we had no problem with you know the concept, we thought that it was so important to win the peace that giving to the coalition more responsibilities that normally they have an obligation they have according to the Geneva Convention was not a problem provided, provided the, the special representative of the Secretary General could have an important role.
We wanted to have the UN having what ever you call it a vital or central role. So we were to make it brief, we were ready to accept more responsibilities and more rights for the coalition but at the same time we wanted to have the UN really playing a vital role, that mean that the special representative of the Secretary General should have a good mandate and second the coalition should report to the Council.
Can I just forgive me interrupt you on that point, because the outcome was, didn't really give the UN a central role did it, the resolution says the UN shall have a vital role but in terms of real power, all of it has remained with the coalition?
I think that the resolution and my explanation of…..I said that the resolution was not perfect and this resolution was not perfect but, but, it , it gives, it gave a, a an acceptable framework and a real possibility for the, for the UN to play a, a you can call it a vital role. Why, why is it so, so important? I think there are two reasons, why it is important to have the UN playing an important role.
First, and as I said is the credibility of the UN. But, the other reason which is … as important as the first one, is that we are convinced that it is, the situation in Iraq is so difficult and it is in the interest of everyone, not only of the coalition it is the interest of everyone in the region in Europe, in the international community to have the Iraqi situation well settled. It is in our interest and it is because we consider that the stability of the region is fundamental that we wanted to help the UN helping, and UN playing a vital role. We do not think it is easy to set up a, for the Iraqi, you know the Iraqi are divided in three communities and it is very difficult to set up a, a government so they will need the Iraqi will need not only the help of the coalition but the help of the UN.
Is it fair to say that countries like yourselves who would have liked to see the UN play a more prominent part in post war Iraq were willing to compromise in the interest of maintaining unity on the Security Council?
Well I think the compromise we have reached is an acceptable one. If it was not acceptable we would not have accepted a resolution and the first draft which was presented by the Americans and the British was not acceptable and hopefully, hopefully the Americans and the British made the necessary concession and this concession made possible a consensus.
Now as I said, it's not in our view, it's not perfect, we would have liked a, a more, a greater role for the, for the UN. As it is it was acceptable, now we have to see how this …. is implemented how the Viera de Melo which is something we have a person which is a very known and very capable person how Viera de Melo is, can implement the, fulfil the mandate he has received. It is too early to, to speak about it because Viera de Melo will come to the Council some times during this month, we did not know exactly if it will be the 15 of July or maybe some days after. He will make his first report to the, to the Council, so we will be in a position to make an assessment of how the resolution was implemented in term of the mandate of the UN, of the Secretary General representative who will be in a position to assess the situation when he will report two weeks from now.
I'd like to if I could to stand back a bit and look at any lessons that can be drawn from this whole period and any pointers to the way things are going to develop in the future. A lot of people have argued that the United Nations and specifically the Security Council was quite severely damaged by the dispute over Iraq, what is your view of that and if it was damaged how long is that , the impact of that going to be felt?
Well, I won't say that it was a, a good outcome for the UN, I think, it is obvious that just after the, the beginning of the war, the UN lost some credibility. But, I do not share the opinion that a huge damage, damage, damage that has been done to the institution of the, of the UN and people will tell you that this has been my opinion and I publicly explain why since, since the beginning and for many reasons.First, this lost of credibility I refer to, I was sure was temporary. It, and the reason was, the reason of this loss of credibility was that the expectations were very high. The expectation were not the same in the US and in that in Europe so maybe here in the United States and maybe in the United Kingdom the expectation was that the UN will, will, will vote a resolution and in other countries in Europe the expectation was that the UN could avoid the war, so but, but this has been very temporarily. Resolution 1483 came very soon and, and showed that when a compromise or when a consensus is possible we in the Council, we know how to make it emerge, how to work out a, a positive outcome. So let me continue.
The second, the second reason why I don't think that the huge damage has been done is that I believe that the Security Council is more needed than ever. And that if the UN need to have the Americans participating fully to the work of the Council I am quite convinced that the United States need the, the United Nations and need the Security Council for many reasons.
The first reason is that this body, the Security Council is the only one who can give legitimacy. And this is something essential. Another reason is that we have to face major challenges which cannot be solved without the UN, terrorism and the UN did a very good job on terrorism, non proliferation and we need the UN if we, if sometime we have to take strong action. Settlement of major crises like the one in, in Congo. Look what happened in the recent weeks in, in Bunia in Eturi, the Security Council authorise a multi-national force and only the Security Council was able to do, to do that.
So there are many, many, many reason why the Security Council is, is more needed than ever. So I am not, I am not, I am not worried.
I can see the logic of course of what you say and many people around the world will agree with it. But would you not accept that within the United States and part, the United States' participation in the Security Council is obviously critical that those who argued against the UN process from the very beginning will now be saying, we told you so, the has failed the challenge which George Bush set it?
No I don't, I don't think it will, it will happen because when you see even what happened after this period the US came with the UK to the Security Council and they asked for resolution 1483 and they made the concession which made possible the adoption of this resolution. Because, as I said, the Council is the body who can legitimate an action so even, months after the war the Americans came to the Council with the British and proposed a new draft, so I don't think there is a, a, a real reason.
Well it we look ahead to what maybe the next crisis on the horizon which is Iran and the evidence that it is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, do you remain convinced that Europe and America acting through the Security Council or not can maintain a united policy on that front, because at the moment they seem to be talking very different languages?
No I will, I will make a more general point about non proliferation and counter proliferation. I think that among, we have four of five main challenges ahead of us and we the European and the US we have to work together to fact these challenges. The first one is terrorism and I think that work, the job we are doing on to combat terrorism is a very good one. Cooperation is very good, the Security Council took the necessary resolution, cooperation among intelligence are very very you know, has improved and it's very good and so we must to keep this cooperation as strong as it is now and I am sure that it will be done. And this is a first challenge, the second was, is non proliferation and counter proliferation. And as you know the European recently adopted a strategy on non proliferation and counter proliferation it is also on the top of the agenda of the Americans and I think that our interest as European and the interest of the American are, are close on that and we have to work together including in the, in the UN, the Security Council but not only in the UN, Security Council and I am confident that we will, we will do it. The third one is the settlement of major crises, what I call, what we call in French, "systemique" crisis, that means crisis which, original crisis which can have effects beyond the region and which can have worldwide effect and the first one is the Middle East and I, what is happening with the cooperation among in the quartet among the Americans the Europeans, the Un and the Russian is, is a very good one. What we are doing in, in Africa, being in Congo or in the western Africa is also an example of, of how to deal together to try to settle this crisis. The first one is, is how, is the question of poverty and I think that we have to and development. And this is a major challenge and we will need and continue to need the UN and the national institution to face this challenge and these are the four challenges we have and I don't think that there are big differences, there can be nuances and tact, different tactics but on substance I think the Americans and Europeans are very close and so I am, not only because I always think positive but I am confident that we will, that we will be able to work together.
But those are broad strategic points and I'm sure you're right that there is broad agreement on the objectives but forgive me for turning to Iran but it is very much a current issue. It's not inconceivable is it to imagine circumstances in the not too distant future where America becomes impatient with Iran over the question of its nuclear programme and say, decides to strike its nuclear facilities in defiance of the rest of the world's opinion, that kind of scenario is really very possible isn't it?
Well again I think that on the major issue on non proliferation there will be, I don't want to because the issue you are raising is not on the agenda for the UN but in general I would say that I don't see, I don't see on no proliferation and counter proliferation issue the, the Americans doing things unilaterally alone. Look, what happened on the North Korean issue there is a very close, very close cooperation and not only among the countries of the region but also these other members like France and the UK who are permanent members and nuclear countries and the consultation and with the Americans on this issue with France and the United States are very very close.
So broadly speaking you see quite a cheerful future for the UN in prospect despite its recent difficulties?
You know yes, I think you know I have been dealing with UN matters now for , for twenty years and I remember the time it was twenty years ago when the Security Council was let's put it like that, it was a place for, for statements and not for action and now our expectation well I say now, it was after the Cold War because it was impossible to agree on something important before the, during the Cold War but after the Cold War the, the cooperation in the Security Council improved a lot. And this started in 1988 with the cease fires on, on between Iran and Iraq and then came the Iraqi crisis and then the Yugoslav, the ex-Yugoslav crisis and other issues like Timor, like Somalia not all of them were, of course Somalia was not a success, far from being a success but not all of them were successful but the cooperation in the , in the Security Council was during the last ten years , improved a lot and the question, why is now, would this continue and my feeling and my assessment is that it will continue because there is no other options. That doesn't mean that we have, we have to reform the , for example about Security Council we in France think that an expansion, a limited expansion of the Security Council member is necessary, we have to improve the way this general assembly is working. There is a lot of action to be taken but the UN system and the multi-lateral system is something which ire, . irrempl, "irremplacable" you cannot replace it and this is the reason why I am confident.
If I could just finally ask you a question on a slightly more personal level , Sir Jeremy Greenstock described a lunch I think you all had with Kofi Anan was keen to patch things up after the difficult times of last year. Can you tell me a little bit about that? And how personal relations are between the ambassadors after those rather difficult days?
Well I think, you know we are all professionals and the relations was , are quite good, you know and that we know how to, how to manage all this, all these situations and I can say that for my part I never been, had a, always had a very good relation with all my colleagues in the Council and I think it is reciprocally it's true.
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