That cloud and the reckoning

So now the recriminations can begin and they will be played out in the media.

Each newspaper will decide first who they want to blame and pick their facts to fit: the government; the EU; Eurocontrol, the Civil Aviation Authority.

Broadcasters, with their legal obligation to be impartial, should do it the other way around and look at the evidence before inviting expert judgment. But we will see.

The big question, of course, is whether it was necessary to close airspace in the first place. And there is clearly the suspicion in some quarters that Eurocontrol massively over-reacted, rather in the way that the WHO did over the swine-flu epidemic. And since our airspace seems to have been re-opened by the twin track approach of redefining what is hazardous - i.e. the hazard itself doesn't change but what we call it does - and by the airlines muscling the authorities, any journalist would be right to take the most sceptical stance possible.

I have an interest to declare. I was stuck in Las Vegas when the cloud descended - selling this website to US educators. And, yes, we did good business. With the help of friends and family, a bit of luck, anxiety and guesswork, I made it back home via New York, Rome, Milan, Zurich, Basel, Cologne and Brussels. If you're inclined to do so, you can read the story here.

One thing struck me during one of the many longueurs, waiting for the next train. What was actually happening, on the ground, with the wealthy stranded - and, let's be honest, most of us trying to get home were not the downtrodden poor - bore no relation whatever to what was being said by governments and institutions or, as far as I was able to find out, in the media.

An object lesson for any journalist.

So here are the questions that I think we journalists should be asking now if we want to avoid the default blame/herd/inquiry/scalp cycle and actually use journalistic inquiry to improve things.

Question 1: Where was the contingency plan?

There was no sign on the ground of any plan to cope with the airspace closure. And while disruption from volcanoes might be rare, there are many other things that could close airspace for extended periods. Terrorism and catastrophic computer crashes, to name but two. 

As a journalist, I'd like to know if there is a plan and what it is.

What are Eurocontrol/Nats/Dept of Transport's roles in that plan? What's supposed to happen? When?

What conversations took place on Thursday and Friday to put that plan into action? Did everyone do what they were supposed to do?

Or does Europe's contingency plan for the closure of airspace amount to making it up as we go along and muddling through?

If so, what's the point of the bodies charged with ensuring safe and efficient transport throughout the EU?

Question 2: Where was the co-ordination of surface transport?

There is no shortage of coaches, trains, hire-cars, taxis in Europe.

Yet throughout Italy, Germany and Brussels - the route I took - not a single extra train was brought into commission. Nor any effort made to direct travellers towards the many trains that were running and had space.

There was no sign at any of the main choke points - in my case, Rome and Milan ... but I understand from fellow travellers that the same was true of Lausanne, Geneva and Paris - that any thought had been given to pulling coaches into service. 

Why did no-one with the power to put a plan into action realize until Tuesday - five days on - that fleets of coaches might be a good idea at hubs and choke points like Madrid and Rome and Barcelona?

Question 3: Why was there no reliable information?

I can attest that the information given at train stations across Europe was invariably wrong and it's hard to avoid the uncharitable conclusion that the constant announcements that all trains were full were designed solely to take the pressure off the ticket offices.

There were not only trains along the many routes north through Switzerland and Germany ... but they had empty seats on them. I saw them.

So whose job was it to co-ordinate the information that exists - and there is plenty of it in databases across the continent - and make sure that information given out was, in fact, accurate?

Question 4: Why were ticketing and travel rules not relaxed?

European trains are a model of modernity. But the way in which tickets are sold would have dismayed the first Thomas Cook.

SNCF were insisting on booked seats - standing is not allowed ... though it is on the equally fast German long-distance trains.

Why did no-one prevail on SNCF to relax this rule?

And why did no-one persuade the train companies to drop - for the duration of the airspace closure - their insistence that international tickets be sold over specific routes on specific trains? Why was no thought given to selling a single ticket - 'Rome to Paris by any route' - for a single price?

No doubt other travellers could add their own to these questions - the problem for journalism is that the questions that really matter on the airspace closure can easily be dismissed as nerdy. Trainspotter's detail.

Yet if these questions - and similar - don't get asked and instead we focus on superficial questions about airport parking charges, compensation and blame, then we don't really fulfil our most basic function. Keeping an eye on how institutions use the power - and money - we give them.