................................................................................ ON THE RECORD DAVID DAVIES INTERVIEW RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION BBC-1 DATE: 10.12.95
................................................................................ JOHN HUMPHRYS: I was talking to Sir Edward a little earlier this morning. David Davies, he is clearly worried about the direction that things are going in since Mr Rifkind took over. What you you say to that? DAVID DAVIES MEP: Well, Sir Edward's a very eminent ex-Prime Minister and his views on Europe are well known. But, he made a point in last Thursday's debate, which he repeated in your clip, which was you've got to know why you're being isolated. Now, this all started - remember - by Mr Blair saying he wouldn't want to be isolated. He wouldn't be isolated on anything in Europe. But, on Thursday, Malcolm Rifkind put to him: well okay what about when we get attacked for our rebate? What about if we get attacked for other things that are critical to our national interest? And, eventually, Robin Cook backed down on that. Our point is very simple and it came out in what Anthony King said about what people in Britain want. They want to be constructively engaged in Europe but they quite rightly want the Government to be tough, when it comes down to defending our national interest and, also, when it comes down to making sure that the ideas that people are putting around for Europe are ones that will work in Europe's interest. In both of those things, it's worth occasionally being isolated, holding your end of the argument up. So, then, you can push it through and win the day. HUMPHRYS: That may well be the case but the point Sir Edward was making is that it's wrong for Britain's Foreign Secretary, as it were, to boast about how proud he might be to be isolated. To take this isolationist position. DAVIES: Well, what Malcolm Rifkind was doing was making very clear that the Labour position is daft, frankly. HUMPHRYS: But, he went beyond that. Everything he has said has not been said in relation to the Labour position. He has said time and again. He meant - from the very first speech he made as Foreign Secretary, as I recall - that this is a position Britain ought to be prepared to take. We ought to be able to stand up there and say: we will stand against the rest of Europe. DAVIES: But- HUMPHRYS: -and this is something we should be proud of. DAVIES: But, your words are exactly right. We ought to be prepared to take. When it comes down to it, when our national interest is engaged, or when some critical aspect of European architecture - to pick the buzz word - is engaged, then, we ought to be prepared to stand our ground. We are prepared to stand our ground. Let me just make one point. I deal all the time with European governments on these matters. One point about it: France when its national interest is engaged, doesn't hesitate for one minute to be tough. Spain, when its national interest is engaged, doesn't hesitate for one second to be tough. I don't see why we should be different. That's what our people want us to be. That's what the British people want. They want to be constructively engaged in Europe but they want us to be tough when it's necessary and other governments understand that only too well. HUMPHRYS: Well, you say other governments understand that only too well. The positions that you've been taking, during the run-up to the Inter Governmental Conference - because you've been a member of The Reflection Group, which is drawing up the agenda, for that massively important conference - shows the extent of our isolation. There are issues there. There are serious issues there where you have been in a minority of one and other people have attacked you for that. So, you're not just talking about isolationism you're demonstrating it time and again. DAVIES: Let me make two points, then. Firstly, on sixty per cent to three-quarters - that sort of range - of the issues dealt with by the Reflection Group, we were in the majority. HUMPHRYS: It depends what the issues are. DAVIES: Well, I'll pick them out for you, then. HUMPHRYS: Well, not in detail. Very quickly, it's been a long association - this. DAVIES: Subsidiarity, competitiveness - those sorts of issues, are issues which now Tony Blair supports, now, 'cos they're popular today. But, they're only popular today because we stood out on them, five years ago, ten years ago, when we were 'in a minority' - so that's point one. Point two on that Reflection Group: at the end of it, the British press and other press went round every other member of the Reflection Group and said to them: how do you feel about Britain's 'obstructive attitude'. Do you know what the answer was? The answer was: we thought Britain was very constructive. The problem was the fundamentalists. Our press, of course, didn't carry that but the Continental press and the Italian press, in particular, did carry it. So, they understand only too well where we're coming from and they know why. And, it's important that they know why because our end of the debate is important. HUMPHRYS: Well, you say 'they'. There are those who take a different view. But, let's look at another example of isolationism, if that's what it is. It maybe..comes under a slightly different heading but it makes the same point. The White Paper that you are now considering. That's to say the White Paper on Britain's negotiating position before the IGC. That is an example of isolationism, isn't it because your hands - your negotiating hands - are going to be tied when you go to that conference? DAVIES: Well, are they? We haven't decided about what we do with the White Paper yet. The Prime Minister has made that clear. He said we're still considering the matter. HUMPHRYS: It's really unlikely there won't be one, isn't it? DAVIES: Well, I don't know. He's considering it and considering it means two options - one way or the other. HUMPHRYS: But he raised it. Mr Major actually raised this possibility. It's a pretty unusual thing to do, isn't it? For a Prime Minister to say: well, here's an idea we've got. The sceptics in the Party cheer him to the rafters and, then, a few weeks later, months later, he says: well, actually, we're not going to do it. DAVIES: It was actually a question to him. So, you know, I can't quite put it that way round. But, there's a simple fact of life with a White Paper, whether it occurs or not. On the one hand, obviously, Parliament wants to know what we're doing as far as they can. On the other hand, we don't want to have our negotiating hands completely tied and that is the position which will be maintained. So, there is, obviously, a balance to be struck there, which is why we're considering it very carefully, before we make a decision. HUMPHRYS: So, if you do decide to have one and as I say it's a bit unlikely that you're going to decide not to have one now - given the reaction that there's been from many of your MPs who would feel greatly let down. DAVIES: That's your view. HUMPHRYS: Alright. Given - Let's assume that you are going to have one. You're not telling me that you're not going to have one, are you? Quite clearly. You're saying: it may or may not happen. DAVIES: It may, or may not. HUMPHRYS: Right. We will accept that. Given that it does happen, therefore, are you suggesting that it will be no more than a kind of vague discussion document? A sort of White Paper, with more greenish tinges than White - just a discussion document. It won't tie you to anything. DAVIES: Well I'm not saying because we haven't decided yet. It's a matter of current deliberation. That is precisely something that has to be discussed and considered before you make the decision. HUMPHRYS: Ted Heath said anything other than that, that's to say just a discussion document would be fatal - that's the word he used, very strong word. DAVIES: Well Ted understands very well how these negotiations are done and in any event, let's make one thing clear, the IGC will last probably a year, maybe longer, I don't know. And, the issues and the alliances and the way the debate goes may well change over the course of that year. We have seen in the last twelve months, as your film showed, some quite dramatic changes in the prospectus in Europe and those dramatic changes could be continued, other dramatic changes could occur. Let me give you-let me just draw a point from that. You made a lot of discussion out of the EMU. The truth of the matter is that Britain - the British Government - has been ahead of the game on EMU throughout. We were the first ones to talk about having an opt-out, then the Danes came in. Now, the Swedes are talking about it. We then went on to say that the 1997 timetable was not pausible. We were the first to say that and then others followed suit and now everybody accepts it. We're now talking about having to assess the consequences of doing it before you do it, very sensible you would have thought. We are now talking about it, the Italians are with us on this and we'll see that develop. All the time we are the ones who've made the running and we are the ones who've actually got the sensible option. You had a nice gambling analogy there, you know the roulette wheel and all that. If you like what we have in this is an Each Way bet on a two horse race. I mean, it seems silly for us to do anything different. So, I think, there's quite a lot to be said for saying the British Government has taken the course of wisdom in this. HUMPHRYS: It's a wholly new definition of making the running when what you're actually doing is delaying things. I mean, it's like tying a couple of lead weights to the horse's hooves and then, saying: how we'll make it. You're not, you're doing exactly the opposite. You are delaying, and certainly that's the way Sir Edward Heath saw it. DAVIES: Not at all. What we are doing is actually saying this is a big project, whether we're in or out and we don't know that yet, it is important to us that it's not done in an unwise way and this is something that we do time and time again in Europe. Again, one talks about being isolated. Very often we start an argument over an issue and then everybody then comes round to see our point of view because we are the ones that look at the detail. We are the ones that say "what would be the real consequences of this. Not just for one group but for the whole of Europe and then once we've got to work that out and we've came to a conclusion as to what that would be then we make the decision. Not before, not on theological grounds, not on sort of ideological grounds about Europe, but on the sensible reasoning as to what will it do for the people of Europe and Europe as a whole. HUMPHRYS: And on those sensible grounds, quite clearly, you have decided you don't want anybody to do it in 1999 do you? DAVIES: No, what we've decided is we want people to look at what they're going to do. Look at the details of it. HUMPHRYS: Right, which means delaying. DAVIES: Look at the details of it. What is more important is that it has got right than it is done to a certain date. That's-I would give you that much, that's key. It is important to get it right, that's the most important thing of all. HUMPHRYS: But it's being seen in many quarters, as again I go back to that word 'a kind of isolation' - isolating ourselves from Europe. Losing our influence in Europe. We weren't invited to Baden Baden were we? DAVIES: Well Baden Baden was a Franco-German summit. HUMPHRYS: Indeed. DAVIES: Just as the other day we had an Anglo-Italian summit. HUMPHRYS: Oh not quite, not quite. DAVIES: Oh yes. HUMPHRYS: I mean the difference was that they got together, the President of France and the Prime Minister of this country got together and had a pleasant meal and shook hands and smiled at the cameras. What they did in Baden Baden was agree on a document which they then signed or at least put their initials to. That's a hugely different matter. DAVIES: Not really. I mean you're-you're inflating something. In fact it's very interesting. When President Chirac came to Britain I was there at Chequers on the day he came. It was a very,very close set of attitudes between then, the French and ourselves and what is interesting subsequently when-Quite often, it's what happens after summits that's key. Look at what's happened subequently. The French are now getting more integrated into NATO, more involved in NATO. A very key issue to the future of Europe, the French supporting NATO in a very emphatic way. I think that's very important and I think in part Britain's had an influence in it. HUMPHRYS: You say had an influence in that but we are giving up. We heard it from several people in that film earlier. We are giving up a great deal of our influence if what we say is we're not going to go into this. Not only are we not going to go into it - at least not for the foreseeable future - but we want to delay the whole process because then people discount us and when important decisions are being made we are not taken any notice of. DAVIES: I have to say again, the aim is not to delay. The aim is to make sure that decisions are made sensibly. You had- HUMPHRYS: By delaying. Oh, come on! You have a procedure that you're following. DAVIES: You had a Mr de Silguy, who is the Monetary Commissioner. HUMPHRYS: Saying some very powerful things. DAVIES: He said some very strong things certainly and one of the things he talked about earlier this year in fact was the idea that EMU should be something which divides up the Single Market, that there should be some sort of barrier between them. Well we view that as wholly wrong, wholly wrong and therefore - and, so, frankly, do the Italians and the Spaniards. HUMPHRYS: Well the Italians want to go in but can't so it's rather different isn't it? DAVIES: But nevertheless they all see the dangers for Europe of having a new dividing line within Europe. HUMPHRYS: Indeed. Indeed and there is that danger. DAVIES: Yes. HUMPHRYS: But what Mr de Silguy was saying was that the danger lies for us, if we chose not to go in, when we are in a position to go in, and that's the difference between us and the Italians. They want to go in but can't, we could but don't want to. They will punish us if we don't go in. DAVIES: Naw! HUMPHRYS: That's what Mr de Silguy was doing. There are real dangers for us. DAVIES: That is a very, if I may say so, that's a very weak line. HUMPHRYS: It's his not mine. DAVIES: It was a very weak line because in order to come up with the final arrangements, the arrangements to cover all this, they've got to get consensus. They've got to get the agreement of those who are 'out' as it were, of the EMU, as well as those who are 'in'. And they can't just say we're going to do this, we're only to impose this, that is impossible. So what we have to do is to make sure that we think through carefully, very carefully, the consequences of what's being proposed and that's what we're insisting on. And you started out by saying we shouldn't be isolated. This is an area where our stand is actually very influential. Very influential. HUMPHRYS: Alright. Well, let me end by suggesting to you that the reason for that stand is not to do with Britain's interest in Europe, but as Sir Edward Heath suggested in that you have a divided Party, you have to satisfy your sceptics, that's what's driving you? DAVIES: Absolutely not. Anthony King said people want to be engaged in Europe, constructively engaged in Europe but they don't want the nonsenses and that's what we are making sure of. That it works properly not badly. It works in the British interest and not against it. HUMPHRYS: David Davies, thank you very much indeed. DAVIES: Thank you. ...oooOooo....