................................................................................ ON THE RECORD AN INTERVIEW WITH SIR LEON BRITTAN RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION BBC-1 DATE: 5.2.95 ................................................................................ JOHN HUMPHRYS: Sir Leon Brittan used to be a Tory Cabinet Minister. For the past five years he's been a Commissioner in Brussels - second in status now only to the Commission President himself. When I spoke to him earlier this morning I asked him if he thought the Europhiles were right to be worried about the way things are going. SIR LEON BRITTAN: Well, you've got to be realistic. The Euro-sceptics are prepared to push to the point of risking the government's existence. The people who are more in favour of a positive approach towards Europe are basically the Loyalists, and therefore there is bound to be the impression that the government is being constantly pushed in a Euro-sceptic direction even though the Prime Minister and others try to maintain a balance in everything they say so it's perfectly understandable that people should be worried, yes. HUMPHRYS: What's at stake do you think? BRITTAN: I think what is at stake is the achievement of Britain's objectives, because there are a high degree of shared objectives, and my experience in the last six years is that if you push in the right way you can get them - you can get those objectives. Let's not forget that the...our partners were not very keen to start with many of them, on letting the Scandinavian countries and Austria into the European Union, still less were they keen on agreeing that Eastern Europe should go into the European Union. There was considerable lack of enthusiasm for agreeing the GATT talks altogether and in all of those important respects Britain has been able to get Europe becoming more open to the outside world, and when it comes to subsidiarity, not interfering too much, that principle's in the treaty, and the Commission's put forward about a quarter of the proposals in 1994 that it did in 1990. so if you push in the right way you can achieve objectives, and Britain does not stand to gain in that conference next year from just standing still. There are important objectives which require change. If on the other hand you give the impression of being defensive and negative, which John Major is determined not to give, but sometimes the tone of the debate in this country makes it seem as if we are acting in that way, then people will not listen to your positive proposals, and we have to have a positive agenda and do have one to achieve British objectives. HUMPHRYS: And is what you're saying that in Europe the attitude is that Britain has a negative rather than a positive agenda? BRITTAN: Well, you only have to look at the debate. People don't just listen to what ministers say, they listen to what everybody says, and the general tone of the debate has got increasingly negative and in some cases sour. Now there may a conflict between a short term political objective of trying to head off the difficulties caused by the lack of a parliamentary majority and the long term objective of securing what Britain needs in Europe. You see if we really do want the further enlargement to the east, if you regard that as necessary from a security point of view, apart from everything else, you have to have changes, you have to have changes in the way the Europeon Union operates, and the way decisions are taken, and if you want to accommodate the fact that the United States is now wanting Europe to take a larger share in organising its defence and that has to be done in some way through the western European Union and the European Union, you need to have changes, and it's not only Britain that has a veto, every other country has a veto. You have to persuade the others to agree to those changes, so it's not in Britain's interests to look totally defensive and to seem to regard everything that might happen as being a possible threat. In fact it's an opportunity. HUMPHRYS: But if that's the impression that the government is giving, then it's doing so because it believed that that is what the British public wants, there is for instance as far as the single European currency is concerned, there is a growing mood in Britain against a single European currency. BRITTAN: Well, you are of course entitled to your views, but it's not a question of the impression that the government is giving, it's a question of the impression that the tone of the debate in this country is giving. Now as far as the single currency is concerned there really is no need for a country that is as pragmatic and as practical as Britain is to engage in a heated debate on this at the moment. I - let us not forget that at Maastricht the government negotiated something as near as you'll ever get in politics to having your cake and eating it - the option to join but not the obligation to join, and the option does not have to exercised for years. I don't myself believe that there's any chance of there being a single currency in 1997. On the other hand I think that it is highly likely that there will be a single currency in 1999. Now it seems very odd for a people that are supposed to be practical and pragmatic as Britain is, to be arguing now about whether to exercise an option in 1999, when nobody at all, even the most fanatical enthusiastic people on the continent are trying to bully or persuade Britain to take that decision now. It will look different then, it will depend on the way in which the single currency is created, who participates in it, because not all our partners will, what economic conditions are like on the continent and in this country, and people will have to decide then, do they think that the advantages of joining outweigh the advantages of staying out, but why get involved in all that now? HUMPHRYS: And what Mr Major is saying now, is that he wants more conditions imposed before anybody reaches the stage of a single European currency. How's that going to go down in Europe? BRITTAN: Well it's not entirely clear whether that is the position. I don't myself think that there is any realistic probability of getting our partners to agree to a change in the conditions. Let's not forget that those conditions are very tight and tough conditions, they weren't set by politicians essentially, they were accepted by politicians but they were devised by the central bankers, including the Governor of the Bank of England at the time, as being what was necessary for a single currency to work if you wanted to have one. The politicians accepted those conditions, if anything the pressure will be to slacken them and to loosen those conditions because it's clear that one or two countries, which might wish to be there in the first phase, such as Italy, simply won't meet those conditions in all probability. I believe.... HUMPHRYS: In other words..I'm sorry...in other words go in exactly the opposite direction that Mr Major is talking about. BRITTAN: There will be some pressure to do that. I believe that pressure will be resisted very strongly because the Germans will only be prepared to go in on the basis of the strict conditions already agreed but the prospect of adding to those conditions therefore, is not likely to be a realistic one. The balance will be to stay absolutely pat where we are but it's not clear whether Britain is going to ask her partners to change. Let me again remind you that if Britain is going to do that, don't forget that everyone of those countries has the same veto that people in this country are insisting and understandably, that Britain must retain. Therefore, you have to persuade them and you'll persuade them according to the tone which you adopt as well as the proposals that you put forward. But the other point I was going to make is that if we're not talking about seeking to persuade our partners, which I do not think is realistic to accept new conditions, but imposing, if you like, new conditions on ourself. I would have thought that that was premature, it's difficult to see why it's necessary to articulate new conditions in order to decide whether to do something in four years' time from now. Those conditions, the new ones, may themselves seem inappropriate at that time. I think the right thing is to leave it open and to see how it looks. The other point I would also make is of course, that again there may be a conflict between dealing with the political situation where anyone is bound to have enormous sympathy with the government faced with the band of rebels, who are prepared to risk the downfall of the government which they were elected to support, in order to pursue their particular agenda and where the parliamentary majority is so tight. There may be a conflict between the requirements of dealing with that situation, as perceived by the government and Britain's national interests because, you know, in a negotiation and this is a negotiation with our partners and our friends next year; it's not usually the best thing to start lying down in advance conditions in detail that you say have to be met. Everybody knows, of course, that Britain has a veto but to say we're not going to agree to this, we're not going to agree to that, we're not going to agree to the other, at this stage, does make it, I think, in the international area more difficult for us to get other people to agree to the changes that we want. HUMPHRYS: And that is precisely what we have done. We have laid down those conditions, we have said, in Mr Portillo's words, no, no, no, on three separate issues before the IGC. BRITTAN: Well if you look carefully at the wording on those issues. On two of them there are sufficient numbers of adjectives and adverbs to be capable of arguing according to what is agreed that it does meet the conditions, I'm not too worried about those. What I will say is about majority voting, we have to be careful about that because there are two conflicting considerations that are important for Britain. On the one hand, of course, Britain doesn't want to be simply outvoted and more readily outvoted. If you look at the record, the number of ocassions when Britain has been outvoted is absolutely minute, that's so...one has to bear that in mind but nonetheless, Britain does not want to be outvoted and therefore, reluctant to change the qualified majority system. On the other hand Britain has an interest as a major country, a large country and with more countries joining, the balance may seem to shift in favour of the smaller countries, so really what you have to have is a certain lateral thinking in which you change the whole system of voting and do that in a way that gives a proper balance to population and size which perhaps is not there at the moment and isn't just designed to stop change.....interest in change and what I'm saying is, that if that's so, simply to say we're not in favour of X, Y and Z, seems to me tactically although understandable, not necessarily the best way of securing a wider objective. HUMPHYRS: So in a nutshell, what are the dangers of the path that we seem, at the moment, to be pursuing? BRITTAN: Well the dangers are of course, are that we put ourselves in a position where we can't persuade our partners to accept the changes that we need in order to get the kind of Europe that we want, one that is open to the outside world, ready to accept new members, organised in a way to do that and able to organise the defence and security poll of the European Union in a way that will make us a safer Continent in the very difficult coming years. HUMPHRYS: Sir Leon Brittan, thank you very much. BRITTAN: Thank you. ...oooOooo...