The doctrine of double effect

The doctrine of double effect

This doctrine says that if doing something morally good has a morally bad side-effect it's ethically OK to do it providing the bad side-effect wasn't intended. This is true even if you foresaw that the bad effect would probably happen.

The principle is used to justify the case where a doctor gives drugs to a patient to relieve distressing symptoms even though he knows doing this may shorten the patient's life.

This is because the doctor is not aiming directly at killing the patient - the bad result of the patient's death is a side-effect of the good result of reducing the patient's pain.

Many doctors use this doctrine to justify the use of high doses of drugs such as morphine for the purpose of relieving suffering in terminally-ill patients even though they know the drugs are likely to cause the patient to die sooner.

Factors involved in the doctrine of double effect

• The good result must be achieved independently of the bad one: For the doctrine to apply, the bad result must not be the means of achieving the good one. So if the only way the drug relieves the patient's pain is by killing him, the doctrine of double effect doesn't apply.
• The action must be proportional to the cause: If I give a patient a dose of drugs so large that it is certain to kill them, and that is also far greater than the dose needed to control their pain, I can't use the Doctrine of Double Effect to say that what I did was right.
• The action must be appropriate (a): I also have to give the patient the right medicine. If I give the patient a fatal dose of pain-killing drugs, it's no use saying that my intention was to relieve their symptoms of vomiting if the drug doesn't have any effect on vomiting.
• The action must be appropriate (b): I also have to give the patient the right medicine for their symptoms. If I give the patient a fatal dose of pain-killing drugs, it's no use saying that my intention was to relieve their symptoms of pain if the patient wasn't suffering from pain but from breathlessness.
• The patient must be in a terminal condition: If I give the patient a fatal dose of pain-killing drugs and they would have recovered from their disease or injury if I hadn't given them the drugs, it's no use saying that my intention was to relieve their pain. And that applies even if there was no other way of controlling their pain.

Problems with the doctrine of double effect

Some philosophers think this argument is too clever for its own good.

• We are responsible for all the anticipated consequences of our actions: If we can foresee the two effects of our action we have to take the moral responsibility for both effects - we can't get out of trouble by deciding to intend only the effect that suits us.
• Intention is irrelevant: Some people take the view that it's sloppy morality to decide the rightness or wrongness of an act by looking at the intention of the doctor. They think that some acts are objectively right or wrong, and that the intention of the person who does them is irrelevant. But most legal systems regard the intention of a person as a vital element in deciding whether they have committed a crime, and how serious a crime, in cases of causing death.
• Death is not always bad - so double effect is irrelevant: Other philosophers say that the Doctrine of Double Effect assumes that we think that death is always bad. They say that if continued life holds nothing for the patient but the negative things of pain and suffering, then death is a good thing, and we don't need to use the doctrine of double effect.
• Double effect can produce an unexpected moral result: If you do think that a quicker death is better than a slower one then the Doctrine of Double Effect shows that a doctor who intended to kill the patient is morally superior to a doctor who merely intended to relieve pain.

The Sulmasy test

Daniel P. Sulmasy has put forward a way for a doctor to check what their intention really is. The doctor should ask himself, "If the patient were not to die after my actions, would I feel that I had failed to accomplish what I had set out to do?"