This is the week when the cross party consensus on Kosovo broke apart. The Conservatives denounced the "gross incompetence" of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The government accused them of undermining the morale of British Forces.

Martin Bell: "A textbook example of how not to wage a war"

While I am not a Conservative - or indeed a member of any other party - I believe that the criticism was justified, and within the opposition's role of critical scrutiny. In fact, those of us who have criticised Nato's strategy are to my certain knowledge echoing the disquiet felt by many of the men and women in our Armed Forces.

There is no example in history of airpower alone achieving a decisive result on the ground. It has not happened before, and is unlikely to happen again. Rather, the bombing has had the effect of worsening the plight of the Albanians in Kosovo, and of consolidating President Milosevic's domestic support.

I know the military quite well and keep their company whenever possible. From my contacts with them, I believe that the principal benefit of the campaign so far has been to provide our military academies with a textbook example of how not to wage a war.

There are only two options open to us. Either we start planning now, and mobilising the necessary troops, for the ground campaign which alone can ensure the safe return of the refugees to their homes. Or we settle for what we can get in a deal brokered by the Russians which would inevitably leave President Milosevic in power and probably involve the partition of Kosovo. This would be a serious feat for the most powerful military alliance on earth and for the principle of humanitarian intervention.

We are still assured that ground troops will be used only in a permissive or semi-permissive environment. There is no precedent for this in the long and distinguished history of the British at war. Agincourt and Waterloo were not permissive environments neither were the beaches of Normandy - and, more recently, the mountains and moors of the Falkland Islands.

Air strikes inflict damage but cannot win the war, Bell argues

Senior figures in the military establishment are now beginning to question the effect of the Kosovo crisis on the future of the British Army itself.

Either it will be seen as too small to be effective in such circumstances, and after years of cutbacks the case will be made for an expansion, especially in the numbers of infantry and combat engineers.

Or else it will be seen as a resource too precious to be used by a government which is reluctant to face the risks and casualties involved. In that case, people will start to wonder about the savings that might be made by not having an army at all, or reducing it to a lightly armed gendarmerie.

These may seem to be marginal questions when set beside the appalling plight of the Albanians in Kosovo, and the greatest war crimes in Europe for more than half a century.