Ex-cabinet Minister Clare Short

Interview with Clare Short 01 June 2003

JEREMY VINE: We're joined by Clare Short, thank you for coming in. We'll come to reconstruction in a few minutes if we can, but first of all, your comments reported on the news. You believe you were duped. Can you explain.

CLARE SHORT: Yes and I'm not saying there wasn't any evidence of some experiments in looking for biological and chemical weapons, so if I could just explain. I think the evidence that Saddam Hussein wasn't complying with UN inspection, thus the sanctions, thus the suffering of the Iraqi people is a matter of public record, and you can look at the reports of the weapons inspectors. There were scientists working, and they were trying to get chemical and biological weapons ... I think the nuclear had been got rid of by inspection previously. Where the exager(fluffs), so that's not contested, and it wasn't contested by Blix and the UN and so on. Where the spin came was the suggestion that it was all weaponised, ready to go, immediately dangerous, likely to get in to the hands of al Qaeda, and therefore things were very very urgent. Whereas if we're saying, the people of Iraq are suffering, Saddam Hussein is resisting the UN, we ought to deal with this, I agree with that. I don't agree with those who say we should have just contained it. But we had more time, therefore we could do it right, that's where my criticism comes. (interjection) And I mean it goes on to, if I just may.

JEREMY VINE: Sure

CLARE SHORT: I now am convinced that Tony Blair agreed with George Bush when he went to Camp David in September, a date for the war. So when he was saying to us, we'll have a second resolution, and for all of us that meant we'll do it properly, and we'll see if Blix can succeed, is there a different way without hurting the people of Iraq to deal with the Saddam Hussein regime which is a vile and brutal regime, and it is good that it's gone; he, our Prime Minister, had committed us to war by mid February.

JEREMY VINE: He'd made up his mind.

CLARE SHORT: Absolutely. But he was telling us, and I believed it, that we might constrain the US, we might get them to go through the UN. We might try and see if it could be done in that kind of way. And the third defeat for me, was the suggestion that France said, that Chirac had said, he would veto any second resolution and this was, Tony Blair and I had private conversations about this, and I remember other occasions when he was pressing me to stay and saying, therefore Clare, the second resolution is impossible. A member of the public has since sent me the transcript of the Chirac interview. He says, the Blix process must be completed, but if it failed in disarming Iraq, then the UN would have to approve military action. So, I'm not just saying there is nothing there, but I'm saying we could have done it properly, and we could have tried without war, minimising the harm to the people of Iraq. I think you had to keep the possibility of military action, to back up the authority of the UN, I've said that throughout but - and we were duped by the speed, so that the, the claiming that the stuff was weaponised, and might be used in 45 minutes, was part of the, the secret commitment to a date, which meant everything had to be hurried along. We were duped by the Prime Minister for the second resolution. What France had said was just (interjection) ...... and then France was vilified as an excuse for nothing having the second resolution, and we've - and because all this was done secretly, the preparations for post conflict were poor, and we've got the chaos and suffering that we've gone now.

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JEREMY VINE: And we'll get on to that.

CLARE SHORT: That is my case though.

JEREMY VINE: Okay.

CLARE SHORT: It's slightly more complicated than weapons of mass destruction or not.

JEREMY VINE: Just on the weapons first. Let's go back to Tony Blair's words, we can see them on the screen what he said in September 2002 he says, 'his dossier concludes Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them. That he has existing and active military plans for their use which could be activated within 45 minutes. Now that's what you've got a problem with.

CLARE SHORT: Absolutely. The 45 minutes, well the Security Services has a briefing on that, and say that there was one source and it was unreliable. What - I saw all the evidence, you .... through, both the summaries and the detailed day to day evidence and our Security Services were saying, what the UN weapons inspectors have said and what the scientists that have left Iraq have said, that there were labs and there were experiments. But that's not the same as the .... bringing in a weapon ready to be, to be used. We also know that Saddam Hussein had ballistic missiles with a range longer than the UN had permitted but Blix got, I'm not sure whether it's sixty four or seventy of those destroyed. So the Blix process was destroying a delivery mechanism, and (interjection) ... we were suddenly told.

JEREMY VINE: So who do you think then - who did the duping.

CLARE SHORT: Well it came from our Prime Minister I'm afraid, because I think, and I'm presume he thinks it's honourable, that he had agreed with Bush that yes, there were be a try at the UN, but if it failed there was going to be war by the Spring come what may.

JEREMY VINE: Could it not have come from erroneous information from the Intelligence Services.

CLARE SHORT: No. No. I think what the Intelligence Services reported was that Saddam Hussein, had the scientists, had these labs that they were being hidden, as the Blix process claim. They had some information from Iraqis about where some of the stuff was hidden. But they weren't saying there was a link to al Qaeda, and they weren't saying it was weaponised and threatening us in 45 minutes. That's where the spin came in.

JEREMY VINE: You were in the War Cabinet, as you say, this evidence came through it. Did it look pretty incontrovertible at the time.

CLARE SHORT: Actually the evidence didn't come through the War Cabinet but it comes in security information which you can read daily and the War Cabinet met rather briefly and then talks about what happened that day and just - and as a matter of fact there isn't, there aren't many meetings. I mean the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee that should be in charge of this kind of thing didn't meet before it all started. It was all done in Tony Blair's study with Tony Blair on the phone to President Bush and David Manning on the phone to Condoleezza Rice and the normal Whitehall systems to make big decisions like this broke down and were very personalised in Number 10.

JEREMY VINE: Did you raise doubts at the time about the evidence.

CLARE SHORT: Well I made clear to Tony and indeed more broadly, that I thought the run-up to war had been mishandled, that we should have had more patience with Blix and so on. I was persuaded by the Prime Minister, and pressed by him repeatedly, to stay because the war was unstoppable, and of course it would bring down a vile regime, and the best thing we could all do is unite to reconstruct the country quickly, and help the people of Iraq take charge of their future, and have a better future. But then, the advice I was giving about how that should be done and the need for the coalition to take very seriously its Geneva Convention obligations to keep order, to keep basic humanitarian services running, and to keep civil administration running, and get the UN in to create a new Iraqi political and interim authority, that was all being ignored. So then there was no point in saying it. It became clearer and clearer that there had been some of this duping and I couldn't do the job that he'd asked me to stay for, which was to get the reconstruction properly organised.

JEREMY VINE: But Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, on television to-day was talking about your position on this, your views on it. He said, 'I obviously appreciate why Clare should now be trying to argue that the original position she took was the justified one, not the subsequent position that she took, where she supported military action'. Pointing out you supported the war.

CLARE SHORT: Indeed, I voted for, even though if it could have been stopped I wouldn't have, because this agreement had been made between me and the prime minister, and he had said to me, no second resolution is possible, cos France has said they'd veto anything, that is untrue. So, and I take responsibility for that, and I wrote a letter to every member of the Parliamentary Labour Party, setting out why I, why I had, I had stayed, where my doubts were and why I'd stay. And then I got lots of post from people who were very disappointed. And then I wrote a letter to everyone who wrote, explaining my position, so that's all a matter of record. I'm not changing my position. I mean Jack would say that wouldn't he. I'm not changing my position, nor am I denying what he said this morning, that there was all this detailed information from scientists that there were labs and there were experiments. That's for sure. The question is were there weapons, was it weaponised. Could it be used imminently. That's where the spin came in.

JEREMY VINE: As you pointed out in your resignation speech, the Attorney General's advice that the war was legal, was based on the accuracy of this information, that there were weapons of mass destruction. Do you now believe the war may not have been legal.

CLARE SHORT: I believe it was legal to threaten military action to back up the authority of the UN, to bring the sanctions to an end. I mean we shouldn't have just left it. I believed until we got the Attorney General's advice, and we got that very late, and the whole of Whitehall was becoming very worried, including our military, who were getting worried that they were going to be instructed to go to war, and they hadn't had the Attorney General's advice, and then we got it very late. But it was significant for me. I mean it was suggested before that, that military action wouldn't be legal without a second Security Council resolution. If the Attorney hadn't given that advice, the top of Whitehall wouldn't have co-operated. I don't think the British military would have obeyed an order to go.

JEREMY VINE: But your view now, knowing what you know, or believing what you believe. Was it legal.

CLARE SHORT: Well given what Rumsfeld has said and what Wolfovitz has said, and they of course have published, publicly called for dealing with the Saddam Hussein regime from 1997 on, before they came in to office, I fear that they were determined to bring down the Saddam Hussein regime, and decided to use weapons of mass destruction argument. I mean that's what they've made clear. And I fear that our Prime Minister had secretly made an agreement with George Bush that come what may we would go in to action. So, I think given the Attorney's advice it was legal, but I think the route we got there didn't honour the legality questions.

JEREMY VINE: And just to be clear on this whole business of weapons of mass destruction, you are saying that information came in to Downing Street and was somehow changed, and the end result of that was a deceit.

CLARE SHORT: I'm saying there was an exaggeration of what everyone knew to be the case. That - so the weapons inspectors weren't allowed to go on from '98 onwards. There was some accounted for pre-cursor chemicals and the rest and there was evidence that there were labs and there was work going on in Iraq that was designed to develop chemical and biological weapons. So, I'm not denying that, and that's what the security briefing was, and that's what the UN weapons inspectors told us. It's the spin that's put on that to suggest that it's imminently useable, and immediate threat to us in 45 minutes and that there's a potential for al Qaeda getting their hands on it. That's where the spin was. That's where the falsity was, and the point about that is it meant that there had to be very urgent action. So it got us to war quickly. Whereas with the reality we could take more time and do it right.

JEREMY VINE: What do you want to see now Clare, an inquiry, an apology a resignation or what.

CLARE SHORT: I just think the truth is very important. I think on a question as big as this, where lots of people have lost their lives, and lots of people in Iraq have lost their lives, the question of, were we duped, and was there a better way that wouldn't have lost all those lives, and didn't - shouldn't we have tried for the better way before we exhausted the possibilities is such a big historical question that we've got to get to the truth.

JEREMY VINE: Do you want to see an inquiry.

CLARE SHORT: I don't know what form, but we've got to get to the truth, and I myself have been reading and exploring, and I've come to the conclusions that I've put to you to-day and it's very sad and very worrying.

JEREMY VINE: Let's talk then about reconstruction if we can. Things have got a bit better in Iraq since the time you resigned; UN sanctions have been lifted, there's now a UN mandate at least. Do you feel they will continue to get better.

CLARE SHORT: I don't think in Baghdad they've got much better. The British troops did, this is the one thing I think the UK added that was different. The UK troops in Basra did much better than the US troops in Baghdad in getting some order and starting to, so people could improve their lives. Baghdad is a disaster. Everything is wrecked. It's completely violent. Lots of people are dying from crime, daily. Electricity is only for limited hours. Hospitals aren't functioning properly. The whole humanitarian system can't work properly. The UN is there, everyone's got supplies because it's also dangerous and disorderly. Given that this war was planned, there should have been plans for keeping order, and this OHRA organisation that was set up in the Pentagon and was meant to be the interim government, should have been preparing for these duties, but instead it was full of politics about who was going to be the next, you know, is Chalabi going to be the next ruler of Iraq.

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JEREMY VINE: ... here as well wasn't there because of course you've already mentioned your differences with Tony Blair and the Conservatives are saying, well the whole government in this country was split between you and Blair, so nothing happened.

CLARE SHORT: This isn't true. We provided money to the Red Cross, worked with the Red Cross, to try and fix water and get hospitals functioning in Basra and in our area. Tried to help Tim Cross, Major General, well Tim Cross is the Deputy in OHRA to be supported, so he could try and get the US to take seriously their Geneva Convention obligations. All of that was going on. The difference was I thought, that the UK should have said very clearly to the US, this is the law, this is what our Attorney says, we're going to comply with it, now OHRA must absolutely focus on its Geneva Convention obligations. Stop the politicking, we'll get the UN in to do that, to create the new interim government, order civil administration, basic humanitarian need, then we can get the UN system in and we can help Iraq move forward. The UK didn't do that. We went along with the fudge on what OHRA was supposed to do, what were the powers of the coalition, and sort of diminished the UN and have now, yes, we've got a Security Council resolution and that's good, but it's given the UN a very small role, a sort of partner with the coalition and occupying power, which as Kofi Annan said just recently, is unprecedented. But my view remains, despite all that, we should get to the truth. We should all unite to help the people of Iraq to re-build their country.

JEREMY VINE: And looking at the big picture there, just finally, you can't deny that they are better off without Saddam Hussein.

CLARE SHORT: Absolutely, there's no question about that and it is my view that leaving it for twelve years, leaving UN sanctions, that strengthened the power of Saddam Hussein and caused enormous suffering for the people of Iraq, was disgraceful, and that that's why I didn't support those who said containment is good enough. Yes, we should address the problem of his defiance of the UN and his war crimes, but we had enough time to do it well. The spin took away the time and creating the urgency to get quickly to war.

JEREMY VINE: Clare Short thank you very much indeed for joining us.

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