DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 105056-A
JF/MB
French

MPB/MJP231281

Ministry of Transporation

Office of the Inspector General for
Civil Aeronautics and Meteorology

Bureau of Accident Investigations
246 Rue Lecourbe 75732 Paris CEDEX 15

No. 18 IGACEM/EA

Mr James B King
Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

Subject: NTSB Safety Recommendations
A-81-150 to 152

Ref: Letter No. 1103/IGACEM/EA
27 November, 1981

Paris, 7 January, 1982

Dear Mr King:

As I informed you in my letter referenced above, this Bureau has carefully examined the Safety Recommendations you transmitted to me on November 9, 1981.

I should like to submit to you the following observations on the results of this examination:

Recommendation 150

The objectives recommend have for the most part already been attained through measures that have been implemented or that are currently being implemented, details of which are given below:

1. Current Air France operating procedure require, when doubt exists with respect to the condition of the tyres at the time of takeoff, that the landing gear remain extended. The requirement may, however, be modified by the possible existence of performance imperatives. (Cf. Enclosed photocopy of Page II - 05-45-10, May 1981, of the Air France Concorde Operations Manual).

2. If the landing gear must remain extended, the landing must indeed occur on takeoff runway or the nearest emergency runway.

3. Regarding the two final points of your recommendation, i.e., informing the cabin attendants and preparing the cabin for an emergency landing, please note that Air France has already instituted these procedures. All that remains for us to do, then, in acting on your recommendation, is to request that Air France again draw the attention of its flight personnel to the importance of adhering strictly to the procedures established for informing the cabin attendants and preparing the cabin for a foreseeable difficult landing.

Recommendation 151

As was just mentioned above, the Air France general procedures include instructions on coordinating the activities of the flight crew and the cabin attendants, especially in the case of a foreseeable abnormal or precautionary landing.

In view of the observations made at the time of the June 14, 1979, incident, I should like to inform you that these measures have already been the subject of a reminder to both flight crews and cabin attendants, and the need for strict application of the established procedures will be firmly pointed out to in-training personnel.

Recommendation 152

Please note that the procedures of the Air France Operations Manual (from which I earlier sent you excerpts taken from both the Minimum Equipment List and the Normal Procedures sections) are, with respect to CVR's, in full compliance with current national and international regulations.

Therefore, the establishment of a new procedure does not appear to be necessary; the company, should, however, be reminded of the extreme importance of strict compliance with these requirements. The February 1981 incident should remain an isolated case.

Immediately following the incident, we pointed this out to Air France and asked that it take every possible measure to prevent the occurrence of such a lapse.

It goes without saying that the copies this letter are being sent to other official French agencies concerned and to Air France.

In the hope that our joint efforts will lead to higher standars [sic] of safety, I am,

Sincerely yours,
(Signature)
J.P. Bonny
Chief, Accident Investigation Bureau
Chief Civil Aeronautics Engineer

Copies:
William P. Clappin, United States Embassy, Paris
Roger Pierre, FAA Representative, United States Embassy, Paris
Mr. Lansalot-Basou, Embassy of France, Washington
Director General of Civil Aeronautics
Chief, SFAT (attn: Mr. Frantzen)
Chief, IGACEM
Mr. Bonny, Chief, Accident Investigation Bureau
Mr. Bourgeois, Technical Investigator, BEA